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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Terri Lee Simmons appeals from the judgment of the district court entered upon
her conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. On appeal Simmons
argues the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Dispatch received a call regarding a suspicious individual in the alley behind the
Like Nu Car Wash. (6/8/17 Tr., p. 3, L. 23 – p. 5, L. 24, p. 8, L. 21 – p. 9, L. 25; see also
Ex. A at 6:20 to 7:25.) An individual had been next to the dumpster and left some
property behind, including a box with a picture of a gun on it. (Id.) The staff of the car
wash called dispatch because they were concerned about the box with the picture of the
gun. (Id.)
When Officer Janicek responded to the scene, there was nobody around the
dumpster in the alley. (6/8/17 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 8-16, p. 10, L. 21 – p. 12, L. 10.) Next to the
dumpster, Officer Janicek saw a small “cat tote,” with a cat inside, and a pile of items,
including a Tupperware, a box and two books. (See 6/8/17 Tr., p. 4, L. 19 – p. 5, L. 16;
see also Ex. A at 10:35 to 10:50 (Officer Janicek recreates how the pile of items were
stacked next to the dumpster).) In the stack was a box with a picture of a gun on it.
(6/8/17 Tr., p. 4, L. 19 – p. 5, L. 16.) Officer Janicek was concerned there could be a gun
inside, so he opened it. (Id.) Inside Officer Janicek found syringes and a plastic spoon
with a clear white substance that appeared to be methamphetamine. (6/8/17 Tr., p. 5, Ls.
17-24; see also Ex. A at 0:00 to 0:26.) The white substance later tested presumptive
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positive for the presence of methamphetamine. (6/8/17 Tr., p. 5, L. 25 – p. 6, L. 7.) In
the Tupperware container Officer Janicek found a green leafy substance and a makeshift
pipe. (See R., p. 120.)
When Officer Janicek was collecting the items for disposal, Simmons walked
around the corner. (See 6/8/17 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 8-16, p. 10, L. 21 – p. 12, L. 10; See Ex. A at
0:27 to 2:48.) Simmons claimed ownership of some of the boxes, but she told Officer
Janicek that the box with the picture of the gun on it was not hers. (See Ex. A at 1:20 to
2:48.)
Shortly thereafter, a car wash employee arrived on scene and explained that he
gave Simmons permission to leave her cat “over there” but that they became concerned
because she left more than the cat, including a box with a picture of a gun on it. (See Ex.
A at 2:56 to 3:40.) The state charged Simmons with possession of methamphetamine,
possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 28-29.)
Simmons filed a motion to suppress claiming that Officer Janicek’s warrantless
search of items piled next to the dumpster was unconstitutional (R., pp. 39-40, 67-76.)
Simmons also claimed that her statements to police were obtained in violation of
Miranda 1 and were the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” (See id.) The state objected. (R.,
pp. 53-54, 83-88.)
At the suppression hearing Officer Janicek’s body camera recording was admitted
as evidence, and, pursuant to the request of the parties, the district court also relied upon
the preliminary hearing transcript. (11/27/17 Tr., p. 8, L. 2 – p. 11, L. 4; Ex. A.)
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2

Simmons testified that she did not remember having a box with a picture of a gun on it.
(11/27/17 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 7-16.)
The district court entered an oral ruling on the record and denied Simmons’
motion to suppress, but also reserved the right to further explain its ruling in a written
decision. (11/27/17 Tr., p. 41, L. 15 – p. 57, L. 5.) In the oral ruling, the district court
applied the two-part test to determine whether Simmons possessed a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the box. (See
- - Id.)
As to the first question of the property, the question becomes for
the Court does the defendant in this case have an expectation of privacy
such that the search of the property should be suppressed?
The Court notes that there is no automatic standing to contest the
legality of a search and seizure for a defendant charged with a crime of
possession. The defendant must show that his or her Constitutional rights
have been infringed. They can’t assert another person’s Constitutional
rights.
So that in this case, if there was another owner of the box with a
picture of the gun on it, and that wasn’t the defendant’s, she can’t assert
the right of the rightful owner of that box.
So the question is, did the defendant have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the area searched or the article seized? And the Court cites,
Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 1978.
The US Supreme Court enunciated a two-step process to determine
whether a defendant has possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in
Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 1979. First, a court must ascertain whether
the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy and second, it must
determine whether the court’s [sic] subjective expectation viewed
objectively was reasonable.
(11/27/17 Tr., p. 45, L. 2 – p. 46, L. 5.) The district court noted that this United States
Supreme Court case law is consistent with Idaho law. (11/27/17 Tr., p. 46, Ls. 6-12
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(citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 859, 893 P.2d 806 (Ct. App. 1995) 2.) The district
court applied the factors and determined that, while Simmons subjectively believed she
had an expectation of privacy in the containers, she did not have an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in those items left next to a dumpster in an alley:
As to one, in viewing the light the most favorable to the
defendant’s testimony and the body cam, the Court finds that the
defendant believed she had some subjective expectation of privacy when
she asked permission of the car wash employee to leave certain property
next to the dumpster.
So then the Court will go to the second prong of the test, is society
willing to accept this subjective expectation of privacy as objectively
reasonable? And this is where the State of Idaho has set forth a number of
factors that can be considered by the Court in determining whether that
subjective expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable.
Use of the property. At the time that the officers were called to the
alley location, to the car wash and went to the alley location next to the
dumpster, the defendant was not using the property. No one was using the
property. The property was sitting there with no one around it.
Did the defendant have the ability to control and regulate the area?
The Court finds that the defendant did not have the ability to control and
regulate the area. She did not own the property. It was a public alley next
to a dumpster, she had left the location. And while it is true she returned to
the location, the Court finds at the time the property was searched by the
officer that the defendant did not have the ability to control and regulate
the area.
The Court can consider the totality of the surrounding
circumstances. The Court notes that simply having permission to
legitimately leave something in an alley does not equal legitimate
expectation of privacy. Defendant had no ownership of the land where the
items were left. She left them in open public view to a public access alley
next to a dumpster.

2

In its oral ruling the district court referenced “State v Jackson, 126 Idaho 859, Court of
Appeals 1995,” however the correct name of the case is State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 859,
893 P.2d 806 (Ct. App. 1995), and thus that is the citation that will be used on appeal.
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This is not like a situation where a person is staying in a guest
room at a friend’s apartment. They normally wouldn’t have an expectation
of privacy since it is not their apartment. But since they are staying in a
guest room they have that expectation.
This is more like the facts in State v Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 2000,
wherein there is no expectation of privacy where you knowingly expose
your property to the public.
I talked about defendant not being present to maintain control over
the property. The defendant was not using the property when found. The
fact that this dumpster location and this public alley was within close
proximity to a school, the school is located across the street. The Court
acknowledges the defense argument that it was a Sunday, however, it was
a Sunday afternoon and based on community safety and the fact that no
one was around the property and the box had a picture of a gun on it and
the items were located next to a trash can, the Court finds that that
supports that the property -- that the defendant’s subjective expectation of
privacy is not objectively reasonable.
Additionally, the defendant in this case denied ownership of the
box with the gun on it. A person does not possess a reasonable
expectation of privacy to which he or she has no possessory or ownership
interest. This comes from US v Thomas, 447, F 3rd, 1191, Ninth Circuit,
2006. And also flows from Rakas, R-A-K-A-S, v Illinois, 439 US 128,
1978. And disclaimer of ownership constitutes abandonment pursuant to
State v Melling, M-E-L-L-I-N-G, 160 Idaho, 209, Court of Appeals 2016.
Therefore, the Court finds in viewing the factors set forth by -- in
State v [Johnson] as well as the totality of the surrounding circumstances
of this particular case that the defendant had no objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy so the threshold Fourth Amendment question
presents further inquiry as to an improper search of these items in the
alley.
When the officer came across the items there was no privacy
interest of any person when he examined those items. And further
investigation by inquiring of the defendant also produced that she denied
ownership of certain of the items, at least the box with the gun on it.
So for these reasons the Court finds that the two -- that the
defendant has not established or carried her burden to establish that she not
only had subjective expectation but also that that expectation was
objectively reasonable and that portion of the motion to suppress is denied.
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(11/27/17 Tr., p. 46, L. 13 – p. 50, L. 8; see also 11/27/17 Tr., p. 55, L. 11 – p. 57, L. 5.)
The district court also entered a Memorandum Decision and Order to further explain its
ruling. (See R., pp. 119-132.) Simmons entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved
the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. (R., pp. 112-114; 11/29/17 Tr., p.
60, L. 4 – p. 72, L. 8.) The district court entered judgment and sentenced Simmons to
five years with two years fixed. (R., pp. 139-146.) The district court suspended the
sentence and placed Simmons on probation for five years.
appealed. (R., pp. 149-152.)
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(Id.)

Simmons timely

ISSUE
Simmons states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred when it denied Ms. Simmons’ motion to
suppress the evidence found as a result of the initial warrantless search of
her closed containers.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Simmons failed to show the district court erred when it denied her motion to
suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless search of a pile of items left in
an alley next to a dumpster?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Simmons’ Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court determined that Simmons failed to establish a reasonable

expectation of privacy in a pile of items left in a public alleyway next to a dumpster.
(11/27/17 Tr., p. 41, L. 15 – p. 57, L. 5; R., pp. 119-127.) On appeal, Simmons argues
the district court erred because she claims, as a homeless person, she has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in items left out in public. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-16.)
Simmons’ argument is not supported by the record or the law.
The record refutes Simmons’ argument because, at the time Officer Janicek
searched the pile of items, he was responding to a call from the manager of a business
that a woman had left some concerning items by a dumpster in the alley. The cases relied
upon by Simmons to establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in items
left in public by homeless individuals are all distinguishable. Most of the cases revolve
around establishing an expectation of privacy in a temporary shelter or housing – not in
piles of items left next to dumpsters.

Simmons failed to establish a reasonable

expectation of privacy and has failed to show the district court erred.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers to the

trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review of the trial
court’s determination as to whether constitutional standards have been satisfied in light of
the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State
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v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309 (2004). If findings are supported by
substantial evidence in the record, those “[f]indings will not be deemed clearly
erroneous.” State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)).

C.

Simmons Failed To Establish That She Had A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy
In Containers Left Unattended In A Public Alley Next To A Dumpster
“A person challenging a search has the burden of showing that he or she had a

legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place searched.” State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho
623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008) (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104
(1980); State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 651, 662 P.2d 230, 232 (1983)). Whether a
person has a legitimate expectation of privacy involves a two-part inquiry: “(1) Did the
person have a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search?
and (2) Is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?”

Id. (citing

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 473, 20
P.3d 5, 9 (2001)). “The first inquiry under the two-part test is an issue of fact.” Id. “The
second inquiry is an issue of law.” Id.

Factors that have been considered part of this

analysis include ownership, possession, control, ability to regulate access to the evidence,
historical use of the item seized, and the totality of the surrounding circumstances. State
v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 859, 862, 893 P.2d 806, 809 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted).
“Abandonment, in the Fourth Amendment context, occurs through words, acts,
and other objective facts indicating that the defendant voluntarily discarded, left behind,
or otherwise relinquished his interest in his property.” State v. Melling, 160 Idaho 209,
211-212, 370 P.3d 412, 414-15 (Ct. App. 2016), review denied (May 24, 2016) (citing
9

Bond v. United States, 77 F.3d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. McDonald,
100 F.3d 1320, 1327 (7th Cir. 1996) (overruled on other grounds); United States v.
Ramos, 12 F.3d 1019, 1023-24 (11th Cir. 1994)).
Under the first part of the test, the district court found that Simmons “exhibited a
subjective expectation of privacy in the property that she asked to leave near the
dumpster.” (R., p. 125; see also 11/27/17 Tr., p. 46, Ls. 13-19 (“As to one, in viewing the
light the most favorable to the defendant’s testimony and the body cam, the Court finds
that the defendant believed she had some subjective expectation of privacy when she
asked permission of the car wash employee to leave certain property next to the
dumpster.”).) The district court also found, however, that Simmons abandoned any
interest in the box with the gun picture. (11/27/17 Tr., p. 49, Ls. 2-12.)
For the second part of the test, the district court found that Simmons’ expectation
of privacy in the items placed next to the dumpster was not an expectation of privacy that
society is willing to recognize as objectively reasonable. (See R., pp. 125-126; see also
11/27/17 Tr., p. 46, L. 20 – p. 49, L. 1.) On appeal, Simmons argues that the district
court erred in finding no objective expectation of privacy in the closed containers because
she is homeless. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-16.) Simmons argues that she had an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the closed containers she stacked by the
dumpster, because she is homeless and has no other place to store her possessions. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-12.) Simmons’ argument is refuted by case law and the record.
The record refutes her argument because her argument is based upon her status as
a homeless individual.

Specifically, society would not recognize as reasonable an

expectation that property left by a dumpster in an alley was not abandoned under the facts
10

of this case. Officer Janicek “responded to a dispatch call to investigate a potential
suspicious subject at the Like Nu Car Wash[.]” (R., p. 120.) “When Officer Janicek
arrived, a car wash employee told him that an older women had been sitting in the alley
behind the car wash, and although she had since left the area, some personal items were
left next to the dumpster[.]” (Id.) “When Officer Janicek arrived at the alley, [Simmons]
was not using the property. In fact, no one was using the property, no one was present
near it, and no one was supervising it.” (R., p. 125.)
Thus, the information available to Officer Janicek, at the time he opened the
containers, was that a woman had left some items in the alleyway next to the dumpster,
no one was around, and the employees of the car wash were concerned about one of the
unattended boxes and called the police.

There was no indication that these items

belonged to a homeless individual and had not been abandoned. Officer Janicek learned
of information regarding Simmons and her permission to leave her cat in the alley only
after the search. (See Ex. A at 1:20 to 3:40.) Even this information would not have
shown the belief that the other property was not abandoned to be unreasonable. Thus, the
information available to Officer Janicek was simply that some containers had been left
and abandoned by a dumpster in an alley.

Any subjective expectation of privacy

Simmons may have had in the items she left by the dumpster in a public alley was not
objectively reasonable.
The cases cited by Simmons also do not support her argument. The cases relied
upon by Simmons involved the police searching a shelter or temporary dwelling place.
See State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 627, 181 P.3d 1231, 1235 (2008) (holding that
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a temporary shelter or “hooch” on
11

public lands); State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 111, 588 A.2d 145, 160 (Conn. 1991) (the
“containers were located in a place that, as the police knew when they searched them, the
defendant regarded as his home, and that he maintained as such, however roughly”)
Homes and shelters, even temporary ones, are granted a high degree of privacy. See
Pruss, 145 Idaho at 626, 181 P.3d at 1234. The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that
“[t]he respect for the sanctity of the home does not depend upon whether it is a mansion
or hut, or whether it is a permanent or a temporary structure.” Pruss, 145 Idaho at 626,
181 P.3d at 1234.
As stated eloquently by William Pitt, “‘The poorest man may in his
cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof
may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain
may enter; but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!’”
Id. (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)).

However, this

expectation of privacy does not extend outside the temporary shelter. See State v. Beck,
157 Idaho 402, 407, 336 P.3d 809, 814 (Ct. App. 2014). (“Therefore, we hold that there
was no expectation of privacy in the campsite, and that the area outside of the tent in
these circumstances is not curtilage.”). Here there was no cottage, no temporary shelter
and no hooch. Here, there was a pile of containers stacked in alley next to a dumpster.
Thus, the expectation of privacy that extends to temporary shelters is not applicable.
Simmons’ reliance on the two Lavan cases is likewise misplaced because the
Ninth Circuit did not address the privacy issue and, in those cases, the homeless
individuals personal items were placed in distinctive “mobile shelters” and containers
provided by service organizations. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-16 (citing Lavan v. City
of Los Angeles (Lavan I), 797 F. Supp.2d 1005, 114 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Lavan v. City of
12

Los Angeles (Lavan II), 693 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2012).) In a civil suit, “nine
homeless individuals living in the ‘Skid Row’ district of Los Angeles, charged that the
City of Los Angeles (the “City”) violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
by seizing and immediately destroying their abandoned personal possessions, temporarily
left on public sidewalks while [they] attended to necessary tasks such as eating,
showering, and using restrooms.” Lavan II, 693 F.3d at 1023-1024. The City had a
policy and practice of seizing and destroying homeless persons’ possessions. See Id. The
nine homeless individuals stored their personal possessions in distinctive mobile
containers or distinctive “mobile shelters” provided by social service organizations. Id. at
1025. The Ninth Circuit explained:
Like many of Skid Row’s homeless residents, Appellees stored their
personal possessions—including personal identification documents, birth
certificates, medications, family memorabilia, toiletries, cell phones,
sleeping bags and blankets—in mobile containers provided to homeless
persons by social service organizations. Appellees Tony Lavan, Caterius
Smith, Willie Vassie, Shamal Ballantine, and Reginald Wilson packed
their possessions in EDAR mobile shelters. Appellees Ernest Seymore,
Lamoen Hall, and Byron Reese kept their possessions in distinctive carts
provided by the “Hippie Kitchen,” a soup kitchen run by the Los Angeles
Catholic Worker.
Lavan II, at 1025 (footnotes omitted). EDAR mobile shelters “are small, collapsible
mobile shelters provided to homeless persons by Everyone Deserves a Roof, a nonprofit
organization.” Id. at 1022 n. 4.
The district court found that the City knew the seized property was not
abandoned. Lavan I, 797 F. Supp.2d at 1014 (The evidence “clearly shows that the City
did in fact know that at least some of the property seized was not abandoned.”). The carts
were “neatly packed” and suggested ownership. Id.
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The district court determined that

the plaintiffs showed a strong likelihood they would succeed on the merits and issued a
preliminary injunction. Id. at 1020. The City appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which
affirmed. Lavan II, at 1027-1028. However, the Ninth Circuit did not affirm on a basis
that the City performed an unreasonable search, but rather on the basis that the City
performed an unreasonable seizure of the homeless individuals’ neatly packed carts. See
id. (“[The nine homeless individuals] need not show a reasonable expectation of privacy
to enjoy the protection of the Fourth Amendment against seizures of their unabandoned
property.”).

The Ninth Circuit explicitly did not decide whether the nine homeless

individuals had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the carts and mobile shelters. Id. at
1028 (“Although the district court determined that [nine homeless individuals] had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their EDARs and carts, we need not decide that
question[.]”).
The Lavan cases are distinguishable, first, because the Ninth Circuirt explicitly
did not address the “privacy” or search question, which the issue here. And, more
importantly, the City of Los Angeles knew that these distinctive mobile shelters and carts
were being used by homeless people to store their personal effects. Here, there is no
distinctive mobile shelter or cart, or even any indication of continued ownership. Officer
Janicek received a call that a woman had left things in an alleyway next to dumpster.
This is a far cry from a city policy of seizing and destroying personal effects that are
clearly being used by homeless persons.
Here, the district court applied the proper factors and correctly determined that
Simmons failed to establish an objective expectation of privacy in the pile of items placed
next to a dumpster in a public alley.
14

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 3rd day of January, 2019.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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